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ON THE CRAFT AND PHILOSOPHY
OF JUDGING
James L .. Oakes*
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH. BY Frank M. Coffin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1980. Pp. xiv, 273. $10.95.
It takes someone like Frank Coffin, who has served in all three
branches of government, to put the appellate process in its proper
perspective. A former Congressman from Maine and a foreign aid
administrator, a long-time United States Circuit Judge, and now
Chief Judge of the First Circuit, he has written The Ways ofa Judge
to shed light on the subject of judging - particularly federal appellate judging - for nonjudges, laymen and lawyers alike, for law students, and for those in journalism or politics. The book's success in
achieving its purpose makes it must reading for lawyers and law students. One can only hope that iJ is also read by others who, in an
increasingly litigious world, should be concerned •with how the
courts of last resort for almost all federal and state cases operate, as
well as with how the judges of those courts deliberate and decide
everything from ordinary criminal and civil cases to the far-reaching
public-interest, institutional, and social-reform cases at the cutting
edge of today's urban, bureaucratized, and pluralistic society.
In summarizing the book, this Review will examine some of the
similarities and differences between Chief Judge Coffin's and the reviewer's courts and between their respective approaches to the judicial process. The Review will conclude with a few comments on the
philosophy of judging that Judge Coffin reveals in his somewhat solemn, northern New England eloquence.
The Ways ofa Judge commences by recognizing the importance,
even granting its invisibility to the public, of the appellate judge's
role. Lacking the influence of the legislator or the executive branch's
"levers of power'' (p. 7), the appellate judge is "a media cipher'' (p.
7), isolated by a code of ethics "more stringent than that imposed on
or accepted by any other group of public servants" (p. 8), but with a
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. - Ed.
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life tenure that is at once the pillar of judicial independence 1 and the
envy of Congress. Judge Coffin notes the judge's personal involvement, the vexing and stimulating "professional-plus-philosophic" (p.
9) challenge of the job, and the constraining but mind-opening discipline of judging. And he makes short shrift of the politicians' old
saw that judges should not "make" law by referring to the gaps left
in nearly every legislative enactment. In doing so, he is rather kind
to the legislatures, particularly Congress. He attributes the gaps to
their inability to "foresee every problem" (p. 10), rather than to compromises knowingly made to transfer to the courts some of the politically hot·issues of the moment. 2
In the course of chapters on "The Appellate Idea in History" (pp.
16-31) and "The Appellate Idea in the United States" (pp. 32-50),
Judge Coffin makes a point that is too readily overlooked by critics
of the courts: Our present system, encompassing state and federal
courts, "represents an achievement . . . that has no equal today or in
ages past in terms of utility and breadth ofreview, accessibility to the
populace, and structure of deliberation" (p. 31 ).
Only as one approaches the center of the book does one learn the
"ways" of a judge. Before moving into the judge's chambers, the
author outlines several of "The Elements of Deciding Appeals" (pp.
51-63), which distinguish appellate review from other types of decision-making. A primary constraint on judicial decision-making, of
course, is its tradition of independence and objectivity. This tradition and other aspects of the appellate process substantially shape
the judge's task. Appeals involve focused review of some decision
made below, and appellate judges must rely on structured (written
and oral) arguments by adversaries. Various constraints and convictions limit their freedom to decide but an area of challenge is always
left open. The constraints include that of writing in the sense that
drafting an opinion makes a judge think, something that I fear is all
too often lost in a day of summary judgments, affirmances from the
bench, "screening" by staff clerks and the like, all of which strain the
quality of justice. Judge Coffin mentions also the constraint of "collegiality," or having to decide by panel, by committee so to speak,
while nevertheless respecting the autonomy of each individual - an
autonomy that may be preserved primarily by the bu.ffers of time
within which to decide3 and the distance between the scattered
1. I may say that it is an independence that nevertheless has its own threats. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979),
2. See Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGES' J., Spring 1979, at 4, 53-54.
3. But see notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text.
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chambers of a judicial circuit.4 He concludes with the perceptive observation that decision-making occurs incrementally, and is "enhanced by prolonged indecisiveness" (p. 61 ). It constitutes, in effect,
"a series of shifting biases" (p. 63), comparable to a series of turns in
a road.
"Work Ways" is a lovely part of the book. It describes the
"chambers community" (pp. 67-74), the relationship of staff and law
clerks to judge, one which I suspect is different with each and every
judge but one which - as Frank Coffin describes his own chambers
- is very close to my own. Ideally, it results in a mutual learning
and sharing experience with the buck ultimately stopping at the
judge's desk (or occasionally in his wastebasket). The ultimate determination is his to make, but with substantial input at various
stages of argumentation by memoranda and by conversation, by editing and occasional drafting. Judge Coffin's phrase, and I cannot
improve upon it, is "creative collaboration" (p. 71 ). Every potential
law clerk should read this chapter. Judge Coffin writes also of Bailey
Aldrich's ''windowsill workload" - the unseen work including pro
se complaints, rehearing petitions, procedural applications, habeas
petitions, and emergency requests (pp. 75-78) - and of the cycle of a
judge's work, monthly in the First and Second Circuits from September through June with some time free in August, or maybe a
week in the dea4 of winter. The "cycle" Judge Coffin calls it (p. 78);
a "pipeline" is my word for it. One must read the briefs, read the
law clerks' memos, hear the arguments, exchange memoranda, confer, write an opinion, ask one's law clerks to edit it, obtain one's colleagues' suggestions or dissents, rewrite, rethink, and file it, consider
the inevitable petition for rehearing, keep one's sense of humor when
someone asks for an en bane vote or the Supreme Court grants certiorari, and :finally, study the long-delayed law review comments,
often reeking of the lamp, but sometimes surgically penetrating. It is
a "cycle," a "pipeline," truly to be cherished by anyone interested in
intellectual challenge, with an inspirational sense of political-socialhistorical American values, aims, and aspirations, but also with a
deep moderating sense of the constraints oflogic, intellectual candor,
practicality, and the evolutionary process of law.
"Preparing for Argument" (pp. 81-108) discusses more specifi4. The Seventh Circuit is the only one, so far as I know, in which all the judges live in and·
work at the same place. This may have some advantages in efficiency; it may even inspire
collegiality. But I think it would tend to narrow one's perspective to live and work constantly
in one metropolitan area with its media and atmosphere. To me, there is a healthy regional
mix of viewpoints that occurs when some of the judges come from other, sometimes distant
places.
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cally the clerk-judge relationship. Rather than use law clerk bench
memos (which I for one find handy for postargument discussion and
for writing interjudge voting memoranda) Judge Coffin prefers to
discuss the cases back and forth, taking notes, after evening (some of
us do it on weekends) brief reading. Going through the briefs can be
the most tedious and discomfiting part of the judge's job; tedious if a
case is frivolous, discomfiting if it does not admit of ready decisionmaking. Judge Coffin mentions the "sheer quantity" (p. 83) of material to be read, 2000 pages or so of briefs per one-week sitting, 5 exclusive of appendices, records, transcripts, and the like. As I do, or
have to, Judge Coffin in effect speed-reads the briefs, reading closely
the simpler cases, getting a general grasp of the more complicated
ones, knowing when and where further exploration is needed, and
sensing the key case where a novel issue is present and "basic values
may determine the outcome" (p. 84). And he mentions, enlighteningly for the nonjudge, perhaps, that the judge thinks of questions he
can ask that ''will make his colleagues think." 6
In what some will find as the most interesting part of the book,
Judge Coffin then discusses three typical cases - two with parties'
and counsels' names changed, one with real names since its facts are
-well-known.7 He describes how each was handled by judge and
staff, summarizes the argument, and relates the outcome. The first is
a drug-smuggling case with a typical search and seizure question and
. several run-of-the-mill subsidiary issues (except for a definition of
smuggling in an 1899 Supreme Court case), 8 including the factual
sufficiency of the evidence question. The second is a highly technical
federal consumer protection case, with over-long briefs and a
tweleve-volume record. We call these kinds of cases "blockbusters,"
and give them a weight of ten on a calendar-weighing scale from one
to ten that our calendar clerks use to even out weekly assignments.
And the third, nonfictional case, ultimately reversed by the Supreme
Court, was a prisoner's civil rights ~ase involving procedural due
process when transfers to maximum security institutions are made.
After describing the facts of each case, but before discussing the
arguments, Judge Coffin lists a few general concerns that recur in
cases regularly. The list includes (1) identifying threshold issues of
5. This number seems high to me on average, but perhaps the First Circuit hears more
cases per sitting - Judge Coffin mentions thirty - and has fewer sittings per judge.
6. P. 84. This is not said deprecatingly of one's fellow judges by Judge Coffin or me; they
are hopefully doing the same thing.
7. Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), revtl., 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
8. Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899).
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jurisdiction and procedure - including appellate jurisdiction, mootness, abstention, and standard of review; (2) understanding the facts,
the arguments made, and the opinion below, which involves reading
within a rationed time-frame, seminar-type discussion with the law
clerks, and familiarizing oneself with applicable prior case law;
(3) scenting weaknesses, "signs of rot" (p. 103) - ploys and critical
omissions of fact, an issue overlooked, a leading case not referred to;
(4) iI!-quiring after the common sense of the situation and determining the underlying policy at stake; (5) determining the best approach
to handling the case - narrowly or broadly, by memorandum or
full-scale opinion; and (6) identifying the last-minute points that the
law clerks should examine before argument. Judge Coffin candidly
says that while he could spend a solid month preparing for thirty
cases, he actually spends fifteen to twenty hours. I think that a fair
estimate of my own time for an equivalent amount of work, but to
do the work within that time does require an ability to speed-read
coupled with a variety of legal experiences, a keen nose for separating substance from form, and a willingness to keep one's mind totally open on a fair number of issues that need further, deeper
exploration in a key five or six of the week's cases.
Chapter Seven deals with "A Term of Court't (pp. 109-42), or
more properly, what happens at oral argument. When the judge has
really probed the facts and law, the argument can be a crucible,
though more frequently it produces only "modest dividends" (p.
110). The interaction between court and counsel may even be of
lesser importance than the interaction between judge and judge. The
conference begins at argument. 9 While the First Circuit confers at
the end of each argument day, when the Second confers depends on
the judges sitting and whether they exchange voting memoranda.
Such an exchange was made in all cases in the days of the Learned
Hand court, when the briefs were not read until after argument;
indeed, the conference was usually held the Friday of the week following argument. Today, the Second Circuit often holds daily conferences because crowded dockets, judgeship vacancies, and the
complicated schedules of the senior, visiting, and district judges who
regularly and often sit on appeal leave us no other choice. According to Judge Coffin, the First Circuit confers - somewhat like a
Quaker meeting - after recess and a possible double-check with the
law clerks. Conference can change views, send thoughts "packing."
Argument itself in the First Circuit for a given side of a case is
9. See note 6 supra.
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twenty or thirty minutes, as it used to be in the Second. Now fifteen
or even ten minutes is usual in our court, twenty the exception, and
thirty only in the infrequent "blockbuster" case and often not then.
The reader will surely enjoy, and I will not attempt to summarize,
Judge Coffin's summary of the arguments and discussion of the lawyers' strategies, as well as a synopsis of the judges' conference, in his
three paradigm cases. I will, however, refer to his views of advocacy,
which he likens to those of a fish on the art of fly-casting. These
include, as keys, the lawyer's ability to sense the level of detail and
sophistication expected of him, which in tum depends on the extent
to which the judge has explored the issues in the case before argument; a "controlled flexibility" (p. 131) allowing the lawyer to answer the judge's questions - now, not later, I would add - while
keeping his engine in gear; a sense of the policies with which the
judge is concerned; a "disciplined earnestness" (p. 132) that conveys
a sense of conviction without making every point a matter of life and
death; and the inevitable "instinct for the jugular" (p. 133), which
involves both going after the opponent's weakness, and sensing one's
own and counteracting it.
Judge Coffin seeks to answer the "bottom-line" question almost
inevitably asked by students: When does argument matter? The
times when argument changes the views of the court are few, less
than ten percent, perhaps closer to five, I would agree. But a good
argument ensures that a good case will not be lost, just as a "submission" by the appellant helps to ensure an affirmance. And a good
argument can help shape (p. 135) the ultimate approach of the court.
Judge Coffin's views on the judges' conference should be read by
all judges. The ad hominem remarks, the not altogether judicial
statements he uses as examples, will ring, I fear, on familiar ears. He
enjoys as I do the constructive debate viewing all the possible dispositions and options, the fascinating "chemistry" that is involved, and
the "simmering" exchange (p. 139). And he mentions the assignment of opinions, a matter with which law clerks seem to be much
concerned. The First, like the Second Circuit, leaves it to the presiding judge to make the ultimate decision. But what presiding judge
would not assign the workload equally, taking the toughest cases for
himself (but not always), leaving the "glory" or some of it to others,
giving the "seniors" and the "visitors" a break perhaps, leaving (or
taking) the writing of a case when it is obvious that there is an even
split to the "swing vote"? Dissatisfaction can arise, of course (Judge
Coffin does not mention it), when the presiding judge either sloughs
off the tougher, less glamorous cases or takes the "big" cases for him-
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self. But human beings, are, after all, only human. So what is new
under the sun?
"The Creation of Opinions" (pp. 143-70) is an apt chapter title.
By now it should be obvious that opinions are made, not born, in a
judge's mind. All of the input - briefs, law clerks, research, argument, conferences, outside reading, 10 life experience, law comprehension - is mustered for a creation, an ultimate effort that is both
physical and psychic, as Judge Coffin puts it so well. One does not
write, one creates - the most satisfying part of the judge's job - but
the creation is by no means solely of the artist. I am sure the process
is not dissimilar to the remarks made about certain sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century artists - "from the school of," "attributed to." An opinion in Judge Coffin's chambers, as in mine, is
not the sole creation of the judge. It has prewriting input, postdraft
and post-circulation input, as well as, sometimes, a long-delayed review in the law reviews, which may be reflected in a later opinion on
the same subject-matter. I confess to the same "feelings of chronic
ineptitude and perennial uncertainty" (p. 144). To the judge who
does not have them, I say, "BEWARE!" Such a judge is fooling only
himself. This is not to say that the judge should let himself always
be open to persuasion. There is a time-a time of decision, of casting the die - when one senses the hidden, inner "feel" of a case, the
result that makes justice for the parties, keeps the "law" in tune with
advancing times, constitutes a "creation," yes, but is, one hopes,
based on precedent, reason, logic, philosophy, experience, common
sense, ethics, history, social value. It is humbling for all of us lower
court judges to know that such opinions are still subject to reversal.
It keeps us not only honest, but when reversal occurs, also bemused,
and serves as an ever-moderating factor to those who would unabashedly practice 'judicial activism." 11
"The Workings of Collegiality" (pp. 171-92) describes, of course,
the inner workings of an appellate court, its "institutional grouping"
(p. 171), the relationship among the judges that Judge Coffin quite
properly finds unique. Regardless of a circuit's size - the First Circuit is the smallest, the Second is of medium size - federal appellate
10. I believe it imperative that a judge keep abreast of the day's news: social, cultural and
economic trends, scientific and environmental affairs, in addition to the general legal developments occurring in the Supreme Court, one's own court, and elsewhere. I would conservatively estimate that doing this involves 30-35 hours a week on top of the regular workload.
And one still must read a little biography, history, philosophy on the subject of one's choice my favorite light reading remains famous trials of the past, just as that of my former -boss
(Judge Harris B. Chase) was contemporary detective stories.
11. See generally Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539 (1981).
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judges share intimacy, deep if selective knowledge of one another,
conduct characterized for the most part by openness and forgiveness,
having no favors asked or given in the judicial context (though frequently given in the personal one), criticism, response, and resolution. If there are lapses of civility, these are usually mended at the
occasional get-togethers that take place at various intra-court functions, as when a colleague is feted, a senior has a significant birthday
or the like. I agree with Judge Coffin that "anticipatory collegiality"
(p. 181) - that based on foreknowledge of the other's sensibilities is the most significant because it enables one to meet the other's arguments, use words or phrases that do not grate raw skin, and call
attention to the areas that one knows will arouse the particular colleague's interest. "Responsive collegiality" (p. 183) he describes as
the give-and-take that occurs after an opinion is circulated. The reactions that he mentions are most accurate: the phrasing of the answering memo, the need to submit not just criticism but substitute
wording, concern for the feelings of the opinion writer, care to avoid
"a posture of either haughty rejection or servile acceptance" (p. 184),
and the ultimate attempt at quality.
Judge Coffin's "simultaneous collegiality" (p. 186), the emergency hearing, often involving matters of moment, really struck a
chord with me: I remember the Kennecott-Curtiss-Wright proxy
battle, whose appeal the late Murray Gurfein and I received at 5:30
P.M. the night before the 10:00 A.M. stockholder meeting (we
worked out our decision about 9:40 A.M., staying the district judge's
order denying Curtiss-Wright the right to vote); 12 the Norton-Simon
tender offer for Avis expiring at 6:00 P.M., whose appeal I received
at about 2:30 that afternoon and alone in the courthouse contacted
my Vermont senior colleague, Sterry Waterman, just flown in and
staying at the Yale Club (we heard the appeal at 4:00 or 4:30 P.M.
and affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against the
tender offer about forty-five minutes later).1 3 Of such decisions - a
third judge was not immediately available in either case - is "simultaneous collegiality" made. It helps, I would add, if the colleague is
as close a friend and skillful a judge as were, in my cases, both Murray and Sterry. "Our court" can hear cases of considerable import
12. The stay ultimately proved sound, since the judgment below was reversed by a unanimous panel. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.
1978).
13. No appeal was taken. The case is captioned in our court as Miller v. Avis, Inc., 573
F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1977) (declining to stay the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a
dissident stockholders' group).
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on a moment's notice and decide them. I have no regrets or compunctions about either decision.
Judge Coffin writes also of "collegial governance" (p. 188)- the
oversight role of the Judicial Council, 14 standing committees, procedures for hearing complaints about judges (established by the Congress over the wise objection of a few judges like my former Chief,
Irving Kaufman), 15 the Administrative Office, the Federal Judicial
Center, the National Judicial Conference. These well-intended and
extremely hard working organizations, alas, sometimes divert the
minds of the judges, Frank Coffin points out, to "the performance of
tasks bearing only a remote relationship to the judging process" (p.
191). Here I quote the judge directly because my thoughts almost
exactly echo his:
My instinct for survival, admittedly far easier to apply in the smallest of the circuits, is to think small, to be skeptical of proposals that
require added staff, meetings, or reports, to resist forming permanent
committees, to suspend judgment on much of the sophisticated technology designed to spare us from our labors. I do not say that my
mind is closed; only that I am increasingly concerned that the devices
of technology and the systems of modem management which are invoked to solve the problems of quantity and expedition may divert our
energies from the goal of the highest quality of justice. [P. 192.]

There is more to judging, surely, than mere bureaucratic
management.
I do, however, take exception to his views on technology. I find
word-processing and inter-office electronic/telephonic communication extremely valuable tools in dealing with the surge of business
that we have in a day of breakdown in what used to be taken for
granted - transportation, rail or air, postal service, and the like.
The combination of "Ma Bell" and Lanier or Wang helps to make
up for the demise of the New York Central, Northeast Airlines, Air
New England, the deterioration of the Lexington Avenue I.R.T., and
the rising price of gasoline. Recently, for example, at a "split sitting," one extending over a weekend, I dictated voting memoranda
from New York to my secretary in Vermont, who put them on the
word processor and telephonically transmitted them to a fellow
judge's word processor back in New York. (I dare not claim that this
substitutes for a real live secretary in New York or I would never be
able to insist that my Vermont secretaries leave the state.)
The final fifty pages of Judge Coffin's book are devoted to
14. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 332(a)(l)(C) (Supp. 1981).
15. See note 1 supra.
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"Thought Ways" (pp. 195-249), and sketch the outlines of the judge's
own judicial philosophy. Using Learned Hand's phrase, he notes
first that we judges are 'jobbists" (p. 196), practitioners of a craft,
with disciplines of the guild, and as such (on the appellate level at
least) are able to decide many if not most of the cases presented to us
with only those disciplines, including precedent, the "rules" of statutory construction, trial court discretion, and the like. He notes the
different roles of the judge in a municipal or local court, who makes
and communicates one-to-one judgments about people, and the
judge at the trial level, who is simultaneously "administrator, manager, diplomat, psychiatrist, and public relations expert" 16 and is
under greater pressures from time to time.
But since by no means all cases are, or can be, decided with just
the tools of the craft, the appellate judge is also an interpreter of
values. Judge Coffin condemns the pigeonholing of judges that so
often takes place in editorial columns, the halls of Congress, or, he
could have added, in the mind of the public generally: "strict" or
"loose" constructionist, "conservative" or "liberal," favoring "restraint" or "activism" (p. 200). Quite correctly he observes that
while labels may be appropriate to some judges on some issues some
of the time, labels also more often end rather than encourage
thought.
He goes on to note that judges, like everyone else, have moral
values that generate immediate responses to certain stimuli, but suggests that identification and consequent excision of these values with
self-conscious analysis is surely necessary. In this regard, he points
to the salutary "disinfectant" (p. 202) of writing down reasons for a
decision - a reminder that summary dispositions can sometimes
conceal bias of the worst type. Of a second set of values, those deriving from the social, economic, and political background of the judge,
Judge Coffin is equally wary- the former plaintiffs' or defendants'
lawyer in a personal injury case, the regulator in an enforcement
agency case, and the like. Knowing the enemy, oneself, and being
on guard is enough, he says. The third set of values, which he calls
neutral in content, he divides into the two camps of Process and Substance: One reasonable judge might resolve the inevitable conflict
between the two one way, deferring, say, to an expert agency, while
another judge might resolve it in the opposite way, substantively advancing the rights of a group of individuals hurt by the agency's ac16. P. 198. Because the author touches so little on the work of nonappellate judges I rather
wish that he had edited out this reference, though I do not disagree with its accuracy, only its
generality.
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tions. Judge Coffin concludes that these often unspoken values
permit judges to reach most decisions without going into jurisprudential or moral philosophy (pp. 204-05).
But then in a chapter entitled "Loss of Innocence and the Quest
for Legitimacy" (pp. 206-14) he reviews for the layman the schools
of legal thought from natural law found "mystically" to contain permanent truths; through Holmes's and Thayer's teaching of deference
to legislatures; to Pound's, Brandeis's and Frankfurter's sociological
jurisprudence; thence after to Judge Jerome Frank and the psychologically oriented "Legal Realists"; and finally to the "Legal Process" School, which emphasizes institutional constraints. Felix
Frankfurter, Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler, and Alexander Bickel, with their "neutral principles" and "passive virtues," are the foremost exponents of this last school, which Judge Coffin calls the
"dominant" school of Americanjurisprudence. 17 He saves the contemporary "rights" thinking of Rawls and Dworkin for subsequent
treatment under the rubric "moral philosophy."
In the penultimate chapter, "Time for Reappraisal" (pp. 215-30),
he develops his own thesis that the. various theories founded upon
the presumption that judges are too undemocratic - too strident,
simplistic, and absolutist. 18 He reminds us, as I have done elsewhere, 19 and as Eugene Rostow did so well20 before any of us, that
'judges are today subject to a relatively high degree of accountability, not notably less effective than that to which officials in the other
branches are realistically subject" (p. 219). "Judicial restraint" is
not, after all, free from value judgments, as the highly charged cases
of the last two decades demonstrate. 21 And three decades of change
have resulted, he points out, in a citizenry more dependent on itself
and bureaucratic institutions, in a shift of society's priorities toward
liberty, privacy and fairness. We are now a 'justice-oriented society" (p. 222) and as such we have seen enormous changes in the
nature of litigation: class actions involving extrajudicial institutions;
a civil rights revolution; enlargement of criminals' civil liberties.
17. P. 214. I question how "dominant" the "Legal Process" school is. The grounds of
jurisprudential debate have largely shifted, it seems to me, to the battle between H.L.A. Hart's
positivism on the one hand and the moral rights theories of Rawls and Dworkin on the other.
See, e.g., Jurisprudence Symposium, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
18. I agree. See Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 946-49 (1979) (James Madison Lecture).
19. Id.
20. Rostow, The .Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 142-44 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 1-7 to 1-9 (1978).
21. See Oakes, supra note 18, at 930-31.
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This litigation, an engine of structural change with its broad-scale
remedies, has now become the focus for much sophisticated debate.
Judge Coffin foresees an increase in these trends as the population
presses against limitations of resources, energy, and space, and as
more and more people demand a justice-determined distribution of
goods and resources.
Judge Coffin's final chapter is "A Judge Seeks His Bearings" (pp.
231-49). I believe he has found his, as much as any mere human
being on a complicated sea can ever find them. He examines various
clusters of closely related rights and discovers a wide disparity in
their treatment. He finds both equal protection analysis and due
process scrutiny chaotic. He uses his own Fano v. Meachum 22 toillustrate this latter point: rights do not exist unless they are given or
"recognized" by positive law. He would not merely abandon the
field; he recognizes the tension in a democracy. 23 He looks to Rawls
and Dworkin and seems to appreciate their rights analysis - particularly the latter's view of the due process and equal protection
clauses as appeals to moral concepts (pp. 239-41), and his fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory.
In the end, he quotes a passage from Philip Soper of which I am
very fond and to which I, too, have referred recently with much
admiration:24
Legal doctrine cannot afford the luxury of becoming a professional's
intellectual pastime. The relevance of moral philosophy to the development of norms for governing a society of ordinary people lies in a
few broad generalizations: Utilitarianism, for example, emphasizes
that we are part of a social whole; Kantianism reminds us, on the other
hand, that we are not mere appendages of the social body. And the
task of judges, to maintain the balance between these poles while the
philosophers are still out, requires practical reasoning that does not
yield easily to unified field theories. To look for more is to ignore the
injunction of one of the first philosophers [Aristotle] to seek "precision
in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits." 25

This is Frank Coffin's as well as my own pluralism. It leads to a
22. 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), revd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
23. I may have carried the ''Tension" motif a little far in likening it to poems and a geodesic dome that "maintains its shape and stasis by a complex of forces pulling against each
other." Oakes, The Role of Courts in Government Today, 14 AKRON L. REV. 175, 186 (1980)
(Whittemore Lecture) (quoting J. JEROME, THE POET AND THE POEM (1974)). Judge Coffin
speaks of a "coiled spring."
24. See Oakes, Property Rights in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 U. WASH. L. REV, 583,
587 n.21 (1981). See also Oakes, supra note 18, at 924 n.81.
25. Soper, On the Relevance ofPhilosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private Property and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 64 (1979) (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHE•
AN ETHICS 1094b (W. Ross trans. 1925)).
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belief in the measurable movement of dispute resolution out of the
courts, in extra- or sub-judicial systems within institutions,26 in the
assumption that the people should become more self-disciplined all under an umbrella of both utilitarianism and heightened sensitivity to individual rights. The "workability factor" must be taken into
account. 27 Judges are now "inescapably" part of the social process,
and must be aware of its crosscurrents and complexities as they work
from day to day and case to case.
Judge Coffin's final point is another reference to accountability,
not in the narrow sense of the judge's being answerable, much less
being demeaned, but in the broader sense of deeper and informed
public participation leading to higher standards and expectations
with greater respect. A judge's "most elusive mission" (p. 249) is
"that of safeguarding individual rights in a majoritarian society with
due regard to the legitimate interests of that society." For that mission, though he would never say so, Frank Coffin's book shows even if one did not know the man - that he is eminently qualified.

26. A. classic example in our own court recently was New York State Assn. for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.) (upholding internal structural decision adding staff to
review panel established to administer institution under consent judgment), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 836 (1979).
27. Judge Coffin has written another classic-this time a law review article-on "workability," which I highly recommended. Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 567, 571-74 (1971).

